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against the representative by an opposition against the latter's
account.
VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Definition of Crimes-Degree of Certainty Required
A number of recent decisions have served to crystallize and
clarify the supreme court's position as to the certainty with
which a criminal statute must define the proscribed criminal
conduct. In State v. Truby' the supreme court previously held
that the definition of keeping a disorderly house, as the keeping
of a house to be used habitually for any "immoral purpose," was
unconstitutional on the grounds of uncertainty. The court had
stressed the idea that the phrase "immoral purpose" was a concept of such diverse connotations that its judicial interpretation
would vary with the standards of morality of each community
and of each individual judge. Such a nebulous standard failed
to apprise sufficiently the individual of the line between proper
and criminal conduct. Following this same line of reasoning the
supreme court held in State v. Vallery2 that Clause 7 of Article
92 of the Criminal Code, which defined contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile as enticing, aiding or permitting a juvenile
to "perform any immoral act," was unconstitutional by reason of
its vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty. Again the supreme
court announced the general principle that a criminal statute
must define the act denounced "with such precision [that] the
person sought to be held accountable will know his conduct is
such that it falls within the purview of the act intended to be
'3
prohibited.
Compare, however, the supreme court's holding in State v.
Saibold4 that Article 81 of the Criminal Code, which defined the
crime of indecent behavior with juveniles as the commission of
"any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 178, 29 So. (2d) 758 (1947), discussed by author (1948) 8 LouISIANA LAW REviEw 283.
2. 212 La. 1095, 34 So. (2d) 329 (1948).
3. 34 So. (2d) 329, 331.
4. 213 La. 415, 34 So. (2d) 909 (1948).
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of any child under the age of seventeen, with the intention of
arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person," was
sufficiently definite and certain. The constitutionality of this
article was attacked upon the principal ground 5 that it failed to
explain the meaning of "lewd or lascivious act." The supreme
court, in upholding Article 81, pointed out that the phrase "lewd
or lascivious" draws a clear and understandable line between
criminal and non-criminal conduct; while the phrase "immoral,"
held insufficient in the Truby case, is subject to such varying
interpretations that it could not properly serve as a basis of criminal liability. The phrase "lewd or lascivious act," characterizing
the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles, was more nearly
analogous to the "lewd dancing" which had been held sufficiently
definite in State v. Rose. 6 To have tried to enumerate in Article
81 all of the various forms which "lewd or lascivious acts" might
take would have resulted in a very cumbersome, and probably
inadequate, definition of the crime. For example, in the Saibold
case, the defendant's acts consisted of placing his hands upon
the person of the victim; while in another recent case, State v.
LeBlancJthe
defendant's acts took the form of indecent exposure
of his person before two young girls.
While the distinction is one of degree, the holdings of the
Truby, Vallery, and Saibold cases formulate a consistent and
fairly understandable pattern of the certainty requirement in
the definition of crimes. General language, as distinguished from
detailed specification, may be used in defining crimes-provided
the words employed are of definite, well-understood application.
In this regard it is significant to note that the 1948 legislature,
following the supreme court's suggestions in the Saibold and
Vallery cases, has re-defined keeping a disorderly house as the
keeping of a place "to be used habitually for any illegal or sexually immoral purpose."" Similarly, it has amended Clause 7 of
the article defining contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile
to read "perform any sexually immoral act." 9
5. Appellant's contention that the age limit "seventeen" was meaningless
in failing to specify whether the law meant years, months, days, or seconds,
was dismissed as being clearly without merit. It is obvious from the general
content of the article that age in years was intended by the legislature.
Accord: State v. LeBlanc, 213 La. 404, 34 So. (2d) 905 (1948).
6. 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
7. 213 La. 404, 34 So. (2d) 905 (1948).

8. La. Act 389 of 1948, discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948)
9 LOUISIANA LAW RVIEW 18, 47.

9 La. Act 388 of 1948, discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948) 9
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 18, 47.
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Attempted Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile
Article 27 of the Criminal Code defines an attempt to commit a crime as requiring the doing of an act "for the purpose of
and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his [criminal]
object . . . ." It is generally held that the mere solicitation of
another to commit a crime is not an act near enough to completion of the crime to constitute an attempt. 10 An exception to
this rule has been recognized in the so-called "two-party crimes"
where assent and cooperation of the victim is essential to the
completion of the crime.11 In line with this exception the Louisiana Supreme Court held in State v. Carter12 that the jury might
properly convict of an attempt to commit carnal knowledge of
a juvenile 13 upon evidence showing that the adult defendant had
solicited sexual relations with a thirteen year old girl. In such
two-party crimes solicitation of the other party constitutes an
overt act which substantially approaches the completed crime
and unequivocally establishes the necessary specific criminal
intent. The facts of the Carter case are not fully set out in the
opinion. The court does indicate by way of dictum that if the
indecent liberties taken with the girl were not sufficiently
unequivocal to constitute an attempt to have carnal knowledge
the offender might still have been prosecuted for the separate
crime of indecent behavior with juveniles.' 4 The availability of
such a prosecution would not in any way preclude the prosecution and conviction for attempted carnal knowledge of a juvenile
if the defendant's acts were sufficient to establish that offense.
Article 4 of the Criminal Code expressly provides that, where
the offender's conduct is criminal according to two separate
articles of the Code, prosecution may be under either in the
discretion of the district attorney.
Felony-Murder
Article 30 (2) of the Louisiana
traditional felony-murder doctrine,
that doctrine to certain aggravated
merated therein. Article 24 restates

Criminal Code codifies the
limiting the application of
and dangerous felonies enuand codifies the general rule

10. See Reporters Comment upon Solicitation and Attempt, found under
Art. 28, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
11. Rex v. Barker, New Zealand (1924) N.Z.L.R. 865 where an attempt
to commit buggery was sufficiently proved by showing that the adult defendant had solicited a young boy to go with him for immoral purposes.

12. 213 La. 829, 35 So. (2d) 747 (1948).
13. Arts. 27, 28, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
14. Art. 81, La. Crim. Code of 1942,
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as to parties-that all those who participate in any way in the
commission of a crime are liable as principals. In State v. Bessar 5 the defendants were carrying out a pre-conceived plan of
armed robbery in holding up a soldier and his feminine companion, and were also attempting to commit aggravated rape
upon the person of the girl. Both armed robbery and aggravated
rape are enumerated in Article 30 (2) as being subject to the felony-murder doctrine, and if either the soldier or the girl had been
killed in resisting the robbery or attempted rape both of the
defendants would have clearly been guilty of murder. The facts,
however, were not so simple as that. After the robbery was completed and while the aggravated rape was being attempted, an
elderly lady passed by, causing the assailants to desist from the
attempted rape. As they were leaving, the girl began to scream
and one of the robbers turned and shot her, causing her death.
The two robbers who were indicted and tried jointly for the
murder of the girl appealed from their conviction and death sentence. They argued that the robbery had been completed and
that they had desisted from the attempted aggravated rape and
were fleeing from the premises at the time of the shooting. In
affirming the conviction Justice Fournet, speaking for the supreme court, held that the killing came squarely within the
scope of Articles 30 (2) and 24 of the Criminal Code, which were
"deemed broad enough to include homicides committed in attempts to escape from the scene of the crime, or where the killing
is done immediately after the conclusion of the project, for the
purpose of preventing detection."' 6 After analyzing the facts of
the case, and the controlling'Frticles of the Criminal Code carefully, Justice Fournet concluded, "Obviously one of the aims of
their common design or conspiracy was to retreat safely and
undetected fom the scene with the fruits of their joint enterprise.
To hold as contended by the defendant in this case would have
the effect of defeating the purpose of the statute and of destroy17
ing its efficacy.'
Simple Kidnapping
When a person forcibly confined is transported from one
place to another the crime is simple kidnapping, 8 rather than
the lesser and more general offense of false imprisonment. 19
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

213 La. 299, 34 So. (2d) 785 (1948).
Quoting with approval from an annotation in 108 A.L.R. 847 (1937).
34 So. (2d), 785, 789.
Art. 45 (1), La. Crim. Code of 1942.
Id. at Art. 46.

1949]

WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

251

Emphasizing this distinction, the supreme court affirmed a simple
kidnapping conviction in State v. Logan.2 0 In that case the victim
voluntarily entered a truck, but remained in the truck against
her will while it traveled beyond her destination at a rapid rate
of speed. In answering defense counsel's argument that there
was no "forcible seizure" of the victim, Justice Fournet very
logically concluded that the defendant's "refusal to stop the truck
and allow her to get out constituted a forcible seizure." Such
conduct restrained the victim's freedom of locomotion just as
completely as if the offender had laid hands upon her or forced
her to remain in the truck at the point of a gun. This interpretation is certainly in accord with the legislative mandate in
Article 3 of the Criminal Code, that ". . . all of its provisions
shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import
of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with
the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision. '21 (Italics supplied.)
Criminal Trespass Upon Inundated Land
Following the same logical method of interpretation, the supreme court in State v. Almokary 22 held that the criminal trespass
article 23 applies to both inundated and dry land. The defendant,
who was seeking reversal of a conviction of criminal trespass,
had been found guilty of paddling a small fishing boat upon
non-navigable waters enclosed by a fence and posted with "No
Trespassing" signs. Defense counsel urged that this did not
constitute a trespass upon any "enclosed and posted plot of
ground," stressing the fact that the offender did not at any time
"walk on or pass over any dry land" of the complainant. In
holding that the unqualified phrase "plot of ground" was obviously intended to comprehend both dry and inundated land,
the supreme court pointed out that to restrict the application of
the provision to an entry upon dry land would render it completely inapplicable to the thousands of acres of swampy land
in certain portions of the state. It should be noted, however, that
whether the land be dry, covered with water, or swampy, the
20. 213 La. 451, 34 So. (2d) 921 (1948).
21. Justice Fournet relies,, in part, upon the general

comment

under

Article 46 which clearly shows that only those imprisonments which are not
aggravated by the additional elements of transportation (Article 45, simple
kidnapping) or intent to extort (Article 44, aggravated kidnapping) are
contemplated by the lesser crime of false imprisonment.
22. 212 La. 783, 33 So. (2d) 519 (1947).
23. Art. 63, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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unauthorized entry is not criminal unless the plot of ground
has been "enclosed and posted." This latter requirement was a
matter of serious debate when the Criminal Code was adopted
in 1942. Landowners in many sections of the state feel that a
mere posting of their land against trespassers should be sufficient to give them the full protection of the penal sanctions of
Article 63. On the other hand the people in the hunting and
trapping regions of Louisiana, where much of the land is owned
by large corporations and is not used for agricultural purposes,
feel that the hunter and trapper should not be excluded unless
the land is in such every-day use that it is enclosed by a fence.
This latter view prevailed in the 1942 legislation and in subsequent legislative sessions where the issue has been raised. It
will be noted that the property invaded in the Almokary case
was completely enclosed and posted.
Gambling-Seizure and Destruction of Punchboards
Used in Conducting a Lottery
The conducting of all forms of gambling "as a business" is
punishable under Article 90 of the Louisiana Criminal Code.
The seizure and subsequent destruction of gambling paraphernalia is authorized under Articles 43 and 48 of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure. In Cobb v. Flournoy 24 the defendant, on
whose premises punchboards were seized, pleaded guilty to the
charge of gambling by conducting a lottery. The trial judge
imposed the sentence and then ordered destruction of approximately 8,000 punchboards valued at $3000.00. In upholding the
order of the trial judge and refusing to order the gambling paraphernalia returned to its original owner, the supreme court held
that the seizure and order of destruction came within the plain
terms of Articles 43 and 48 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Indictments-Naming of Injured Party
The name of the person injured is a substantial element of
the charge in crimes against the person-even when the short
form is used. Thus the short form for aggravated rape is "A. B.
committed aggravated rape upon C. D.' '25 Article 230 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure expressly declares that in such cases the
24. 213 La. 167, 34 So. (2d) 412 (1948).
25. Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act 223
of 1944.
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indictment shall state the name of the person injured, or if such
name is unknown "the indictment shall make it appear, by sufficient allegation, who was the injured party. '26 In State v. Wil-

liams27 an indictment for attempted aggravated rape simply re-

cited that the victim was "a minor child whose name is unknown." In holding the indictment to be fatally defective, the
supreme court pointed out that the mere designation of the
injured person as "a minor child" could apply to any person
under the age of twenty-one years. Such a general description
falls far short of the identification contemplated by Article 230,
and would not support a plea of former jeopardy if a subsequent
charge of attempted aggravated rape should be filed. The state
relied heavily on State v. Richmond,28 an infanticide case in
which a charge that the defendant "did kill and murder a female
child, whose name is to the said jurors unknown" was held to
sufficiently describe the deceased. While recognizing the fact that
a detailed identification of the deceased may sometimes be impossible in infanticide cases, the supreme court refused to extend
the doubtful holding of the Richmond decision to the case at
bar where further identification of the little girl, who was the
29

victim, was easily possible.

Indictments-Specific Charge of Acts Constituting the Offense
In State v. Saia30 an information for gambling 3' fully charged
the essential elements of that crime and also contained further
allegations specifying the particular form of gambling chargedthat is, by operation of a bookmaking wagering establishment
at a place outside the race track grounds. Defense counsel's
motion to strike out the additional language as surplusage was
overruled by the trial judge. In affirming the trial judge's ruling,
the supreme court first pointed out that Louisiana criminal procedure did not authorize a motion to strike. Treating defense
counsel's motion as a demurrer or motion to quash, 32 the court
26. Id. at Art. 230, as amended by La. Act 147 of 1942.
27. 36 So. (2d) 400 (La. 1948).
28. 42 La. Ann. 299, 7 So. 458 (1890).
29. Justice Hawthorne significantly declares, 36 So. (2d) 400, 402, "We
do not know whether this court would follow the ruling in that case in an
infanticide case since the adoption of Art. 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but in the instant case, the charge being attempted aggravated rape,
we cannot understand why the State did not allege a more detailed description of the party injured, or, further, did not amend the indictment prior
to trial upon learning the name of the party Injured."
30. 212 La. 868, 33 So. (2d) 665 (1947).
31. Art. 90, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
32. Objections to the indictment must be taken by demurrer or by
motion to quash. Art. 284, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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then pointed out that mere surplusage would not vitiate an otherwise sufficient indictment.83 As a matter of fact the addition of
such details as were included in the Saia information should tend
to clarify, rather than to becloud, the issues. Additional allegations, explaining the precise form of the crime, are frequently
inserted in informations and may serve to avoid the delay incidental to the necessity of a bill of particulars. This practical
consideration is further borne out by the 1944 amendment 34 to
Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which enlarged
the scope of the short form indictment to embrace all crimes
included in the Criminal Code. After providing that it should be
sufficient to charge all Criminal Code offenses by name and
article number, the amended Article 235 significantly states that
the validity of the short form indictment is not affected by also
including "a more particularized statement of the facts of the
offense charged."
In State v. Damico35 the information for gambling by bookmaking outside the race track premises similarly charged the
offense by specifying acts which clearly came within the definition of gambling in Article 90 of the Criminal Code. The charge
was concisely stated, and no effort was made to attack it on the
ground of unnecessary prolixity. The Saia decision showed the
futility of this approach. However, counsel for defense urged
that the information was insufficient because it did not specifically charge that defendant committed "the crime of gambling
as prohibited by Article 90 of the Louisiana Criminal Code." In
upholding the sufficiency of the information, the supreme court
relied upon Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
authorizes the charging of a crime by stating all the facts necessary to constitute the offense. The allegations in the Damico case
clearly charged the commission of acts sufficient to constitute
gambling under Article 90. As a further justification of the
instant decision it should be noted that while Article 235 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the charging of gambling
by means of the name and article number of the crime, the short
forms thus available are not exclusive. The first paragraph of
Article 235 expressly provides that "any other forms authorized
by this or any other law of this state may also be used."
Briefly summarizing the situation, the indictment for a crime
33. Relying upon the express language
Proc. of 1928.
34. La. Act 223 of 1944.

35. 213 La. 765, 35 So. (2d) 654 (1948).

of Art. 240, La. Code of Crim.
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included in the Criminal Code may take any of three different
forms: (1) The short form provided in Article 235 may be used,
and the defendant may secure the details through a bill of particulars. This method was judicially approved in State v. Davis.3
(2) The short form may be used with additional particulars
added in the indictment. Such additional allegations are specifically authorized by Article 235, as amended in 1944, and may
serve to avoid the delay incidental to a bill of particulars. (3)
The indictment may follow the form of the Damico case and
charge the crime by stating all elements of the offense. A danger,
inherent in this method of indictment, is the possibility that all
elements of the crime might not be fully and clearly included
in the charge. It is to relieve against this contingency that the
short forms are made available by Article 235.
Indictments-Correspondence of Allegations and Proof
Most crimes may assume a variety of forms, and may be
committed in a number of ways. Under the short form indictment, the accused is briefly but clearly apprised of the particular crime with which he is charged. Additional details, explaining the particular way in which the crime is charged to
have been committed, are secured through a bill of particulars,
additional allegations in the indictment, or both. While these
additional facts are not essential to the validity of the indictment,
they serve the very important function of informing the defendant of the precise nature of the accusation-thus enabling him to
understand fully the charge and prepare his defense. It is logical
and just, therefore, that the crime proven in the trial must correspond to the particulars of the charge, as thus amplified.
In State v. Wooderson 7 an information for obscenity,
couched in the language of Clause (3) of Article 106 of the
Criminal Code, charged the public performance of an act of
lewdness and indecency. In proof of the charge the state's evidence showed that the defendant had proposed sexual relations
to the prosecuting witness while in the presence of another person. These improper advances were held not to constitute the
"performance" of an act of lewdness or indecency, and a conviction based upon this evidence was, therefore, reversed. In so doing
the court significantly remarked that the facts might establish
a violation of Clause (4) of the obscenity article, which covers
36. 208 La. 954, 23 So. (2d) 801 (1945), discussed (1947) 7
REVIEW 293 and (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW RVIEW 715.

37. 213 La. 40, 34 So. (2d) 369 (1948).
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any public solicitation or attempt to solicit an act of lewdness
or indecency.
It is hoped that the court's holding in the Wooderson case
will not be used as an opening wedge for an attack upon the use
of the short form indictment for those crimes which may be
committed in a number of different ways, which ways are separately stated in the article defining the crime. In such cases
the problem is no different than in the case of murder, which may
be committed by either an intentional killing or an accidental
killing while engaged in the perpetration of an aggravated and
forcible felony,88 or of gambling, which may assume any of a
myriad tempting forms.8 9 Use of the short form has received
consistent judicial approval in these cases. 40 Where the short
indictment is used, the defendant is fully apprised of the particular form his transgression is alleged to have taken, either by
additional allegations or by a bill of particulars. It is logical that,
as in the Wooderson case, the state's proof must conform to these
particulars.
Indictments-ChargingDisjunctive Crimes
Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the
somewhat anomalous rule that when several distinct offenses
are disjunctively enumerated in the same statute, or section of
a statute, and only one criminal act is charged, the alternative
offenses may be cumulated in a single count, "but in that event
they must be charged conjunctively." In State v. Williams41 the
defendant was convicted of corrupt influencing,42 a crime which
embraces either "the accepting or offering to accept" anything
of value with the specific intent that the recipient shall corruptly
influence any of those persons covered by the public bribery
article of the Criminal Code. 48 The indictment, which charged
that defendant did "accept and offer to accept" money with the
intent that he would corruptly influence an employee of the
38. Art. 30, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
39. Gambling as defined in Article 90 of the Criminal Code covers all
forms of gambling "as a business."
40. See Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 78. In State v. Davis,
208 La. 954, 23 So. (2d) 801 (1945), noted in (1946) 6 LOUIsiANA LAW REVIEW
715, a short form indictment for gambling was held sufficient.
41. 213 La. 924, 35 So. (2d) 856 (1948). The court also reaffirmed its pre-

vious holding in State v. Williams, 211 La. 782, 30 So. (2d) 934 (1947), discussed (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 287, that It is unnecessary in charging
the crime of corrupt Influencing to name the specific employee intended to
be corruptly influenced.

42. Art. 120, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
43. Id. at Art. 118.
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City of New Orleans, was held to come within the clear intendment of Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Conversely, however, in City of Shreveport v. Bryson44 the
defendant was prosecuted for reckless driving in violation of a
city ordinance, and the affidavit charged operation of a motor
vehicle "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
drugs." In holding that the disjunctive charging of the offense
was improper, the supreme court relied upon the express directive of Article 222. Explaining the reason for that rule, Justice
Hawthorne pointed out that where the offenses are charged alternatively or disjunctively the precise accusation against the defendant is left uncertain. Where the offenses are charged conjunctively the defendant is, theoretically at least, apprised of
the fact that both ways of committing the crime are being
charged. The technical nature of the rule stated in Article 222
and applied in the Williams and Bryson cases is borne out by
the fact that when a proper conjunctive charge is made proof of
5
4
either charge will sustain a conviction.

It would appear that the benefits of Article 222 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, which permits dual charging if the sacramental conjunctive form is used, would also be available in a
case like State v. Wooderson, discussed in the preceding section.
If the state was in doubt as to whether the offender's conduct
constituted the public performance of a lewd or indecent act
within the meaning of Clause (3) of the obscenity article4" or
constituted a public solicitation or attempt to induce another
person to commit an act of lewdness or indecency within the
meaning of Clause (4) of that article, both methods of committing the crime might be stated in the bill of particulars, or in the
particularized allegations of the indictment. In such case the
two charges must be stated in a conjunctive, rather than a disjunctive, form.
Prescriptionof Stale Indictments
The defendant has a right, under Paragraph 3 of Article 8
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to an order nolle prosequing
an indictment which has laid dormant for three years. By ex44. 212 La. 534, 33 So. (2d) 60 (1947).
45. State v. Bryan, 175 La. 442, 143 So. 362 (1932). The crime denounced
was assenting to a bank deposit with knowledge that the bank was insolvent or in failing circumstances, and the indictment charged the offenses
conjunctively. Held, proof of either insolvency or failing circumstances was
su~ffcient to sustain a conviction.
46. Art. 106, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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press terms of Article 9, the three-year prescriptive period "shall
be interrupted" by defendant's absence from the state without
written consent of the court. As a result of this interruption
prescription runs anew from the date the defendant returns to
the state; and it is not possible to make out the three-year period
by tacking the time elapsed before defendant left the state to the
time accruing after his return.
While not expressly so stated, it was clearly intended that
the three-year prescriptive period should only run while the accused was available for prosecution. Thus the prescription does
not run when the defendant has been adjudged presently insane
in another prosecution, which adjudication would serve as a bar
to any criminal trial. 47 The controversial issue in State v.
Theard 1 was whether the adjudication of insanity interrupted
prescription, as does voluntary absence from the state;
or whether
prior
the
period
case
in
which
prescription,
it merely suspended
period
to the adjudication of insanity could be tacked with the
after the adjudication that the accused was presently sane and
amenable to criminal prosecution. In adopting the latter view
and permitting a tacking of the prior and subsequent periods,
the court -reasoned that cessation of the prescriptive period by
reason of insanity is an unfortunate circumstance over which
the defendant has no control. Thus, there is no reason to penalize
him by the loss of the prescription accrued prior to his affliction.
A different situation is presented where the running of the period
is stopped through the defendant's deliberate act of leaving the
state without securing the court's permission. In that case the
law properly provides that the prescription shall be "interrupted,"
with the result that the previously accrued prescription time is
lost. This distinction is in accord with analogous civil law cases
holding that prescription is merely suspended by minority or
insanity, but is interrupted where the cessation results from
human activity.
Method of Drawing Grand Jury
Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directs that
the judge shall select a suitable person from the grand jury list
to serve as foreman, after which the sheriff shall draw names by
lot from an envelope "until eleven answer, who with said foreman, shall constitute the grand jury." Strict compliance with
47. State v. Theard, 203 La. 1026, 14 So. (2d) 824 (1943).
48. 212 La. 1022, 34 So. (2d) 248 (1948).
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this procedure is mandatory, and the grand jury has been held
to be illegally constituted where the names were drawn from
an open cigar box rather than from an'envelope. 49 In State v.
Ross 5° one juror failed to appear and answer when his name was
drawn. A telephone communication with the absent juror indicated that he had been confused as to the day of the call and
would leave home immediately to appear within the hour for
service. Acting upon this advice the trial judge treated the
absent juror as a member of the grand jury and ordered the
sheriff to proceed with the drawing until the jury was completed. In overruling defense counsel's objection that the procedure followed was irregular, the supreme court declared that a
grand juror, once his name is drawn, "becomes thereby irrevocably a member of the jury, and the judge is powerless to remove
him, except for legal causes subsequently arising." 51 The court
went even further and intimated, by way of dictum, that the
defendant "might" have some ground for complaint if the absent
juror's name had been discarded. 52 However, it is submitted that
the Ross case presents one of those borderline situations where
the trial judge could, with equal justification, either have treated
the selection of the unavoidably absent juror as complete or have
considered the selection as incomplete and directed the drawing
of another juror in his stead.
Selection of Jurors-Alleged Discrimination
It is well settled that the systematic exclusion of negroes
from jury service constitutes a denial of "equal protection of
the law" to a negro defendant.5 3 In State v. Ross,5 4 a negro defendant appealed from a murder conviction, urging that the grand
jury which returned the indictment against him was composed
entirely of persons of the white race. The grand jury in question
was drawn from a list containing the names of eighteen white
men and two negroes. In overruling this objection the court
pointed out that there was "no evidence whatsoever" of any
systematic discrimination or exclusion of negroes in the selection
of the grand jury. The prohibition against discrimination does
not give the negro defendant a right to have members of his
race serve as jurors or grand jurors in a particular case, and no
49. State v. Kiefer, 186 La. 672, 173 So. 169 (1937).
50. 212 La. 405, 31 So. (2d) 842 (1947).

51. 212 La. 405, 413, 31 So. (2d) 842, 844.
52. 212 La. 405, 414, 31 So. (2d) 842, 845.
53. See Comment (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 548.
54. 212 La. 405, 31 So. (2d) 842 (1947),
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evidence in the Ross case indicated that the two negro names on
the grand jury list were consciously and purposely excluded in
the drawing.
The prohibition against discrimination, set out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, was admittedly
adopted for the protection of negroes. Its provisions, however,
are broad enough to include any race or color. Also group discrimination has frequently been urged. In State v. Krieger,5
defense counsel moved to set aside the petit jury venire on the
ground that white manual laborers were systematically excluded
by the jury commission. The motion was overruled on the ground
that the objection was not raised within the time prescribed by
Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and upon the
further ground that, even if it were filed timely, the evidence
failed to prove the discrimination alleged. The trial judge, whose
per curiam was given great weight by the supreme court, commented very favorably upon the work of the jury commission
and had pointed out that the venire selected represented a very
fair cross-section of the community. It is interesting to note that
charges of class discrimination have been frequently urged, but
seldom upheld.5" In such cases adequate proof of actual discrimination is ordinarily wanting. As pointed out in a footnote to the
Krieger case, the defendant would have the further burden of
showing that the exclusion of jurors of his particular class
resulted in actual injury to him. The recent United States
Supreme Court decision of Fay v. New York, 57 where two labor
union officials unsuccessfully urged discrimination against laborers and women, further illustrates the extreme reluctance to
grant relief in cases other than those involving racial discrimination.
Additional Petit Jury Lists
Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for
the drawing from the general venire box of a list of thirty names
to serve as petit jurors during each week of the session of court.
This list of thirty names will be inadequate for the trial of a
capital case with multiple defendants, since each defendant is
allowed twelve peremptory challenges and the state a like number. In order to provide for this eventuality Article 185 authorizes
the judge to order the drawing of additional jurors from the reg55. 212 La. 527, 33 So. (2d) 58 (1947).

56. See Comment (1948) 8

LOUISIANA

LAW REVIEW 548,

57. 332 U. S. 261, 67 S. Ct. 1613, 91 L. Ed. 1517 (1947).

552.
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ular venire to supplement the petit jury list. In State v. Rachal 8
the defendant and three others were charged with robbery. Another case set for the same week involved four defendants
who were charged with attempted murder. In order to provide
an adequate petit jury list, the trial judge ordered the drawing
of thirty additional jurors for that week. The attempted murder
case was concluded early in the week and three of the co-defendants to the robbery charge pleaded guilty. As a result the regular
jury list was wholly sufficient for the trial of the Rachal case
and other cases remaining on the docket, and the trial judge discharged the additional jurors. Rachal was tried and convicted
by a jury of five chosen from the regular jury panel. Defense
counsel objected to this jury, insisting that he was entitled to
a jury selected from a list composed of jurors of both the supplemental and regular panels. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the supreme court pointed out that the calling of additional
jurors under Article 185 was a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial judge and that as a corollary of that discretion the
trial judge "was invested with the same power to order the discharge of these additional jurors when he felt that the regular
panel would be sufficient for the cases remaining on the criminal
docket." Appellant failed to show any abuse of the trial judge's
discretion or that he had been injured as a result of the discharge
of the supplemental jurors. If as a result of the discharge of
the supplemental jurors, the regular petit jury list proved inadequate and it became necessary to call in tales jurors to complete
the jury which tried the defendant, a different situation would
have been presented. The defendant's right to demand that available general veniremen be used before the tales jurors are
called59 might well be invoked in such a situation.
Voir Dire Examination-Questions by District Attorney
Special causes for which jurors may be challenged by either
the defense or the prosecution included the general ground "that
he is impartial, the cause of his bias being immaterial. . .. "60
Questions may be propounded on voir dire examination for the
purpose of testing the qualifications of the prospective jurors to
serve fairly and impartially. In State v. Guin61 a sixteen year
old boy was charged with murder, an offense within the exclusive
58. 212 La. 731, 33 So. (2d) 501 (1947).
59. State v. Atkinson, 29 La. Ann. 543 (1877).

60. Art. 351, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
61. 212 La. 475, 32 So. (2d) 895 (1947).
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criminal jurisdiction of the district court even though the accused
is a juvenile.6 2 In his voir dire examination of prospective jurors
the district attorney questioned them to ascertain whether or not
they could try a defendant under seventeen for the crime of
murder as they would an adult. A negative answer to this line
of questioning would show that the juror was antagonistic to
the constitutional provision requiring a criminal trial of the
juvenile in capital cases, and was incapable of rendering a fair
and impartial verdict. Defense counsel argued that the questions
propounded deprived the accused of the benefit of the juror's
natural lenient attitude toward a juvenile. In rejecting this contention the supreme court pointed out that the age of the accused
is not an element or a determining factor in the establishment of
the crime of murder, and that any conscientious scruples which
the juror might entertain against the criminal trial of a juvenile
charged with a capital crime would necessarily disqualify him
from service. At the same time the court recognized the fact that
it would be entirely appropriate for the jury to take age into
consideration, after they reached their decision on the question
of guilt or innocence, in determining whether the defendant
should be made to pay the extreme penalty for his crime or
whether they should qualify their verdict. The questions propounded would have been improper had they sought in any way
to limit the juror's inherent power to qualify his verdict."
Present Insanity
The plea of present insanity 64 may be raised at any time,
either before or during the trial. It is not a plea going to the
issue of guilt or innocence of the accused, as does the plea of
insanity at the time of the crime. 65 The issue raised by a plea
of present insanity is whether the defendant is presently "insane,
or mentally defective, to the extent that he is unable to under62. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §§ 35, 52.
63. See State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So. (2d) 104 (1941), where it was
held improper for the district attorney to ask the veniremen "If you were
satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, you
were convinced by all the facts and circumstances that the defendant was
not entitled to a qualifying verdict or mercy, would you vote for the
death penalty?" The court pointed out that the jury's power to qualify
its verdict, provided in Article 409 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was
an unlimited power which could not be impaired by seeking to bind the
jurors in advance.
64. Provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 267, La. Code 6f Crim.
Proc. of 1928.

65. Art. 14, La. Crim. Code of 1942 adopts the "right and wrong" test
for the defense of insanity at the time of the crime.
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stand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." 66
The decision in State v. Estes6' stresses the requirement that the

present mental condition of the accused is controlling. In that
case the lunacy commission reported to the effect that the accused
was presently sane, but that he was subject to future attacks of
mental aberration. The trial judge, acting on the report of the
commission, ordered the trial deferred and the accused committed to the East Louisiana State Hospital. In setting aside the
order committing the accused to the East Louisiana State Hospital and ordering his immediate trial for the crime charged, the
supreme court stressed the fact that it is the present mental condition of the accused which determines whether or not the trial
shall proceed. A probability that the accused may become mentally incompetent at some future date does not justify a delay
of the trial if he is presently able to understand the proceedings
and to assist in his defense.
The defendant's right to a hearing on the plea of present
insanity is not an unqualified one, and is only provided for in
cases where the trial judge "has reasonable ground to believe"
that the defendant is mentally incapable of understanding the
proceedings and assisting in his defense. In State v. Bessar8 a
defendant, charged with murder, urged a claim of present insanity and moved for the appointment of a lunacy commission to
inquire into his mental condition. In support of this motion
defense counsel produced affidavits showing that certain of defendant's ancestors had died insane and containing uncorroborated statements that defendant was presently insane. The only
medical testimony available indicated that the defendant was
presently able to understand the proceedings against him. Holding that there was no showing of a reasonable ground to believe
the defendant presently insane, the trial judge ruled him sane
and refused to appoint a lunacy commission. In affirming the
trial judge's ruling the supreme court relied heavily upon its
previous opinion in State v. Ridgeway69 where affidavits of
defendant's mother and aunt were held insufficient proof of present insanity to require the trial judge to appoint experts to examine the defendant. Justice Fournet stressed the general principle
that the questions of the necessity for a hearing on the issue of
present insanity and for a sanity commission were addressed "to
66.
67.
68.
69.

Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
212 La. 694, 33 So. (2d) 199 (1947).
213 La. 299, 34 So. (2d) 785 (1948).
178 La. 606, 152 So. 306 (1933).
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the sound discretion of the court" and very aptly pointed out
that the appointment of a lunacy commission in the instant case
"could have served no other purpose than to delay the proceedings." Lest we construe this opinion as indicating an almost
unreviewable discretion in the trial judge, it should be compared
with the supreme court's holding in the fairly recent case of
State v. Gunter.70 In the Gunter case the evidence submitted by
defense counsel showed that the defendant had been discharged
from the navy and awarded a thirty per cent disability compensation because of his nervous condition. Testimony of defendant's family and friends showed that he evidenced many traits
of mental instability. This showing, according to the supreme
court, raised a substantive and bona fide insanity question and
was sufficient to entitle the defendant to a hearing on the issue
of present insanity and the appointment of a lunacy commission.
While the distinction between these cases is not subject to easy
categorical statement it would appear that the evidence of insanity must be substantial and trustworthy. The trial judge's ruling
that no substantial and bona fide insanity question is presented
will not be lightly overruled by the supreme court.
The trial judge's discretion, under Article 267, is a two-fold
discretion. He shall hold a hearing on the issue of present insanity if he "has reasonable grounds to believe" that the defendant
is insane. In cases like the Bessar and Ridgeway decisions the
plea of present insanity was not supported by substantial and
creditable evidence and the trial judge properly refus6d such a
hearing. Where a sanity hearing is ordered it is also discretionary with the trial judge whether a sanity commission will be
appointed to examine the accused and report upon his mental
condition. 71 In State v. Allen,7 2 where the defendant pleaded insanity as a bar to execution, the trial judge fixed an immediate
hearing on the issue of present insanity, and summoned the
defendant's witnesses. However, the trial judge refused to
appoint a lunacy commission, thus avoiding the delay and expense which is necessarily entailed in the examination and report
by the lunacy commission. Since all evidence pointed toward
sanity the supreme court held that the trial judge's refusal to
appoint a lunacy commission was a proper exercise of his judicial
70. 208 La. 694, 23 So. (2d) 305 (1945).
71. Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 stipulates that the court
after fixing a hearing "may" appoint experts to investigate the mental condition of the accused.
72. 204 La. 513, 15 So. (2d) 870 (1943).
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discretion, preventing the use of the insanity plea and procedures as a dilatory tactic.
Self-Defense, Burden of Proof
The use of force or violence upon the person of another may
be justified upon the ground of self-defense. 73 Such justification,
however, is not an affirmative defense where the accused must
bear the burden of proof. It is well settled in Louisiana jurisprudence that where self-defense is urged by the accused the
state bears the burden of proving beyond any reasonable doubt
that the attack was not justifiable.7 4 In State v. Smith75 defendant appealed from his conviction of simple battery on a charge
of aggravated battery, and urged that the trial judge committed
reversible error in refusing to specially charge the jury "that
where a plea of self-defense is made by the defendant it is the
duty of the state to prove that it was not self-defense." While
an unqualified refusal to give such a charge would have been
erroneous, the trial judge's per curiam indicated that the jury
had been fully and correctly instructed as to the burden of proof
regarding self-defense. The trial judge pointed out that the
burden which rests upon the state, to prove all elements of criminal liability beyond any reasonable doubt, applies also to the plea
of self-defense, and that "if the plea raised a reasonable doubt
in their minds they must give it to the accused and acquit him."
The Smith case is significant in that it reaffirms the former jurisprudence as to the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense
and lays at rest any false notions that the codification of rules as
to justification in Articles 18 through 20 of the Criminal Code
should have in any way affected the general rule that the state
must show the defendant's criminal act, and also the lack of
justification if that issue is raised, beyond any reasonable doubt.
Improper Remarks by District Attorney -Appeal
Prejudice

to Racial

Improper remarks by the district attorney must be objected
to at the time if they are to be subsequently urged as reversible
error.76 Where objection is seasonably raised, prejudice may
usually be prevented and the defect cured, if the jury is immediately instructed to disregard the intemperate utterances of the
73. Art. 19, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
74. State v. Ardoin, 128 La. 14, 54 So. 407 (1911).

75. 212 La. 863, 33 So. (2d) 664 (1947).
76. Art. 510, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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prosecution. In some instances, however, the improper remarks
are so damaging that the error cannot be cured by the judge's
admonition to the jury to disregard them. This exceptional category of statements which are reversible error per se has been held
to include comment by the district attorney upon the defendant's
failure to take the stand and testify.77 Another very serious type
of improper remark by the prosecution occurred in State v.
Moore78 where several negro defendants were prosecuted before
an all-white jury for the attempted murder of a white man. In
the course of his examination of one of the negro participants
in the brawl who pleaded guilty, the district attorney said to the
witness, "Then you struck him because he was a white man."
Defense counsel promptly objected, and the trial judge's per
curiam indicated that he instructed the jury to disregard the
question. After conviction defense counsel moved for a new trial
and argued that the above question constituted an appeal to
racial prejudice in contravention of the express prohibition in
Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While recognizing
the general rule that improper remarks may be cured by immediate instruction to the jury to disregard them, the court held that
an appeal to racial prejudice constituted an incurable error and
could not be offset by an admonition to the jury to disregard it.
This was true whether the appeal was made directly in argument
before the jury, or was achieved indirectly in the form of a question propounded to a witness as in the principal case.
Responsive Verdicts
The responsive verdict problem had plagued trial judges,
and ultimately the Louisiana Supreme Court, for many years.
Out of a maze of cases, decided both before and after the 1942
Criminal Code, a fairly intelligible pattern may be discerned.
First, all elements of the lesser offenses must be included in the
major offense charged. Second, the lesser and included offense
must be of the same generic class as the crime charged in the
indictment. 79 After a comparison of the lesser offense with the
crime charged, if both of these tests are met, the lesser offense
may then properly be included as a responsive verdict.
77. State v. Marceau, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898); State v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904).
78. 212 La. 943, 33 So. (2d) 691 (1947).
79. For a complete and careful analysis of the generic and included

offense requirements of responsive verdicts in Louisiana, see Comment (1944)5 LouiSrANA LAW REVIEW 603.

1949]

WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

267

In State v. Roberts80 the appellant was indicted for attempted
murder by shooting the victim with a pistol, and was found guilty
of aggravated battery. In holding that a verdict of aggravated
battery was not responsive to the attempted murder charge, the
court carefully analyzed the two offenses and pointed out wherein
all elements of aggravated battery are not necessarily included
in the greater offense of attempted murder. In attempted murder,
use of a dangerous weapon is not essential, whereas the use of
such a weapon is a necessary ingredient of aggravated battery.
Further, attempted murder may be committed even though the
defendant completely misses his victim, while it is essential to
aggravated battery that actual force or violence be applied to the
person of the victim. Counsel for the State argued that the
attempted murder indictment had actually charged that defendant
shot the victim with a pistol, and that the charge, therefore,
included all necessary elements of aggravated battery, as well as
attempted murder. In rejecting this contention the supreme
court very properly held that "the test of whether a lesser offense
is included in the charge of a greater is not that the indictment
alleges a statement of facts showing a commission of the greater
and lesser offenses, but rather that all of the elements of the
lesser crime are included in the definition of the greater offense."
Had additional grounds for the court's decision been necessary,
it could have been further supported upon the theory that the
two crimes were not generic. Attempted murder is a species of
the criminal homicide genus, while aggravated battery belongs
to the assault and battery class of crimes. This view is directly
supported by the supreme court's earlier holding in State v. Guillory,8 ' where a verdict of guilty of an assault with intent to murder was annulled as not responsive to a murder indictment because the two offenses were separate and distinct and were not
of the same generic class.
2 the supreme
In State v. EnglerthU
court held that a negli8
3
gent injuring verdict would be responsive to a charge of aggravated battery. 84 In so holding the court pointed out that negligent injuring was a lesser forni of the battery offenses. The
crime of battery, whether aggravated or simple, requires a general intent to inflict injury. The crime of negligent injuring
80. 213 La. 559, 35 So. (2d) 216 (1948).
81. 42 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 690 (1890).
82. 213 La. 158, 34 So. (2d) 409 (1947).
83. Art. 39, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
84. Id. at Art. 34.
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requires criminal negligence, which is lesser in degree but similar in nature to the general intent to injure which is the mental
element of battery. A careful comparison of the definition of
"criminal negligence" in Article 12 of the Criminal Code with
the definition of "general criminal intent" in Article 10 (2) substantiates this similarity.8 5 While not conclusive, the inclusion
of negligent injuring in the same chapter of the Criminal Code 6
as the assault and battery crimes strengthens the conclusion
that it is of the same generic class.
The most important responsive verdict decision was handed
down in State v. Brown,87 where the court gave full effect to the
substantive law rule, stated in Article 27 of the Criminal Code,
that an attempt is a generic lesser degree of the basic crime.
Previously the supreme court recognized attempted aggravated
rape as a responsive verdict to an indictment for aggravated
9 that a verrape,"" and held in the recent case of State v. Carter"
dict of guilty of attempt to commit carnal knowledge of a juvenile would be responsive to an information charging the -basic
offense of carnal knowledge of a juvenile. However, in the homicide cases the supreme court ruled that verdicts of attempted
manslaughter and attempted murder were not responsive to a
murder indictment.9 0 After a careful appraisal of the jurisprudence and of Article 27 of the Criminal Code, Justice Fournet
rendered an opinion which frankly and fearlessly reversed the
supreme court's previous holdings that an attempt was not a
responsive verdict in homicide cases. The supreme court's previous holdings that attempt verdicts were not responsive to a
murder charge might have been technically justified on the
85. Id. at Art. 10. Criminal intent may be specific or general; general
criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when
the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of,
human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.
Id. at Art. 12. Criminal negligence exists when, although neither specific
nor general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the interest
of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below
the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful
man under like circumstances.
The dissenting opinion, predicated upon the idea that the "criminal
negligence" element of negligent injuring was not necessarily included in
the general intent element of aggravated battery, loses sight of the fact that
the distinction is one of degree and not of kind.
86. Title II, Chapter 2, Assault and Battery (with Related Offenses).
87. 36 So. (2d) 624 (La. 1948).
88. State v. Ferrand, 210 La. 394, 27 So. (2d) 174 (1946).
89. 213 La. 829, 35 So. (2d) 747 (1948).
90. State v. Love, 210 La. 11, 26 So. (2d) 156 (1946); State v. Bray, 210
La. 573, 27 So. (2d) 337 (1946). For a complete critical analysis of these
decisions see Comment (1946) 7 LoUISIANA LAw REVIEW 127.
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ground that the enumeration in Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which included only manslaughter and negligent
homicide' as responsive verdicts to murder, was intended as an
exclusive enumeration. A practical consideration which also induced the exception was the idea that the state should be required to charge in advance whether the offender actually killed
or merely attempted to kill the victim. In the Brown case, however, the court analyzed the substantive nature of an attempt,
which is clearly treated as a generic and lesser degree of the
basic crime both by the express language of Article 27 and by
the jurisprudence. It was deemed inappropriate that this clear
intendment of the substantive law should be defeated by the
technical construction of an article of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the court's views as to the practical utility of the
attempt verdict in homicide cases.
While decisions such as those handed down in the Roberts,
Englerth, and Brown cases had done much to solve the responsive verdict riddle, some uncertainty still prevailed. There was
also a general feeling among the district judges throughout the
state that trial convenience and justice were not served by treating all lesser and included generic offenses as responsive verdicts.
This meant that the jury must be instructed upon the law governing these lesser offenses, even though the facts adduced at the
trial pointed clearly toward the more serious grades of the crime
charged. The Louisiana District Judges Association considered
this problem and carefully analyzed the responsive verdicts for
the crimes set out in the Criminal Code. As a result of this study
the association proposed a statute, adopted in 1948,91 which
amended Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to
spell out responsive verdicts for the more important crimes.
Under this statute some lesser and included crimes are omitted
from the authorized responsive verdicts. In determining these
omissions the District Judges Association gave special consideration to the probability of jury confusion resulting from the consideration of a large number of possibly irrelevant crimes. At the
same time they realized that there were certain situations where
the particular grade of the crime depended upon close questions
of fact which could not be definitely determined in advance of
jury trial. For example, while attempts to commit crimes meet
the general criteria of the lesser included and generic offense
theories, attempts have been listed as responsive verdicts only
91. La. Act 161 of 1948.
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for those crimes where the dividing line between proof of the
completed crime and proof of an attempt is rather uncertain. Attempted aggravated rape is made responsive to a charge of
aggravated rape. On the other hand, attempted murder and manslaughter are not responsive to a murder charge. Thus by legislative fiat the law is now specifically drawn to authorize the
supreme court's earlier view that attempts would not be responsive in homicide cases. Under the new statute the only lesser
responsive verdict to the charge of aggravated battery in the
Englerth case would be simple battery, since negligent injuring
and assaults are not included. Similarly negligent homicide is
no longer responsive to a murder or manslaughter charge. These
omissions are based upon the idea that it is better to require the
state to choose in advance between liability predicated on intentional injury and liability predicated on criminal negligence than
to run the risk of jury confusion and compromise verdicts which
result from charging the negligent forms in intentional homicide
and battery cases. In such cases the prosecution must choose the
crime for which it will prosecute and is not afforded a right of
dual prosecutions.
The omissions in the responsive verdict statute were based
upon practical, although sometimes debatable, considerations of
trial convenience. On the whole they should result in more careful jury consideration of the important issues relating to guilt or
innocence. The importance of the 1948 responsive verdict statute
lies, however, not in the specific decisions to omit or embrace
certain included offenses, but in the fact that it provides certainty in an area of criminal law where uncertainty would inevitably breed confusion and frustration of justice 2 The right of
the legislature to exclude certain generic offenses as responsive
verdicts was clearly affirmed by a per curiam opinion, denying
an application for a rehearing, in the Brown case. "It is within
the province of the legislature," declared the supreme court, "to
determine what verdicts shall be responsive to the crime
'93
charged.
Habitual Offender Statute
The Louisiana habitual offender statute 94 provides for the
imposition of appropriately heavier penalties upon those who
92. For a more complete analysis of the responsive verdict statute see
Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 41.

93. 36 So. (2d) 627 (1948).
94. La. Act 45 of 1942, amending La. Act 15 of 1928 [Dart's Crim. Stat.
(1943) §§ 709.1-709.4].
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have been previously convicted of other felonies. Two 1948
decisions were concernedwith important questions as to which
prior felonies shall be counted in determining the status of the
accused as a multiple offender. In State v. Ambrose9 the appellant was convicted and sentenced for attempted armed robbery
as a fourth offender. Among prior convictions charged against
the defendant was a 1938 conviction of larceny from the person
of $2.53, then a felony.9 6 That offense would now constitute petty
theft, a misdemeanor, under Article 67 of the Criminal Code.
Defense counsel argued that the present nature of the crime
must determine the propriety of counting a previous conviction
in sentencing the accused as a fourth felony offender. In overruling this argument, the supreme court clearly and correctly
held that the controlling consideration, in counting prior felony
convictions, is the nature of the crime at the time of its commission. This position was strengthened in the instant case by the
fact that the repealing clause of the Criminal Code had expressly
preserved the continued applicability of the supplanted statutes
to crimes committed prior to such appeal.
Section 2 of the habitual offender statute is a prescription
clause, providing that the increased penalties shall "not be applicable in cases where more than five years have elapsed since
the expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the
previous conviction or convictions ....-97 In State v. Broussard"

the appellant, who was tried and convicted as a fourth offender,
argued that the first felony charged against him should have been
omitted from consideration. That conviction, and also the service
of the eight months sentence imposed, had been more than five
years prior to commission of the current felony. In overruling
this contention Justice Hamiter pointed out that such an interpretation would "render the statute practically meaningless and
worthless." In virtually all third and fourth offender cases, and
especially where the intermediate sentences have been substantial, it is inevitable that a period in excess of five years will have
elapsed between the expiration of the first sentence and the last
conviction. The only logical and practical construction of the
five year prescriptive period stated in the habitual offender statute is to hold, as the supreme court did in the Broussard case,
95. 212 La. 1062, 34 So. (2d) 261 (1948), followed with approval in State v.
Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So. (2d) 883, 886 (1948).
96. La. Act 40 of 1914.
97. La. Act 44 of 1942, § 2 [Dart's Crim. Stat. (1943) § 709.2].
98. 213 La. 338, 34 So. (2d) 883 (1948).
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that a five year period shall not intervene between the date of
the commission of the current or latest felony and the expiration of the sentence imposed for the next preceding felony conviction. Applying this test to the instant case the court found
that no such period had intervened between the third and fourth
felonies, or between any of the successive felony convictions
which had formed the basis of the sentence imposed. This interpretation is in keeping with the evident purpose of the 1942
habitual offender statute. In addition to providing less drastic
penalties for the multiple offender, the 1942 act sought to give
the criminal a better chance for rehabilitation by providing that
he would not be treated as a habitual offender if he could avoid
further felony convictions for a period of five years.
Bill of Exceptions-Basisof Appeal
Trial irregularities, if they are to serve as the basis of an
appeal, must appear in the record of the case. Three 1948 supreme
court decisions dismissed defense appeals by simply applying
the well-settled rule that where no bill of exceptions has been
reserved in the trial court, and the error is not patent on the
face of the record, nothing is presented for review.99 ' In State
v. Wagner 0 0 defense counsel claimed to have excepted to the
admission of certain testimony. Evidence adduced at the hearing
on the motion for a new trial was conflicting. The trial judge
stated in his per curiam that while he was within seven feet
of the lawyer and paying close attention, he had not heard any
bill of exceptions reserved. In affirming the trial court's ruling
that no sufficient basis was established for a motion for a new
trial, the supreme court pointed out that defense counsel "should
have made certain that his exceptions, together with the evidence, objection and ruling, were being noted by the minute
clerk. The mere notation by the clerk of 'Bill Reserved' would
have been insufficient."' 0'1 The court distinguished its previous
holding in State v. Reed 0 2 where the insufficiency of the record
was through no fault of defense counsel. In that case the counsel
for the defense had dictated his objections and the reasons assigned to the court stenographer, and did not suspect that, due
99. State v. Hartson, 213 La. 483, 35 So. (2d) 24 (1948); State v. Asher,
213 La. 131, 34 So. (2d) 399 (1948); State v. Jones, 213 La. 78, 34 So. (2d) 381
(1948). This rule is a natural and logical application of Art. 502, La. Code
of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
100. 36 So. (2d) 7 (La. 1948).
101. 36 So. (2d) 7, 9.
102. 180 La. 741, 157 So. 547 (1934).
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to carelessness and stenographic ineptitude, the bill of exceptions
finally transcribed in the record would omit many of defense
counsel's objections and the reasons assigned for them. The failure of the clerk to perform her duty had deprived the defendant
of his statutory right 103 to have his objections, the facts relied
upon, and the court's rulings reduced to writing and made a
part of the record.
The state's right of appeal is very limited and only embraces
appeals from final orders dismissing the prosecution prior to
trial, as by the sustaining of a plea of improper venue or a plea
of prescription, or the quashing of a fatally defective indictment.
After the trial has proceeded to a verdict of acquittal, the state
has no right of appeal regardless of the trial irregularities committed. To allow an appeal in such case would probably be held
to constitute double jeopardy. State v. LeCompte'0 4 involved an
appeal by the state from a judgment ordering the nolle prosequi
of a manslaughter indictment for failure to bring the defendant
to trial within three years. The state did not formally object and
did not reserve a bill of exceptions to the ruling complained of.
Defense counsel argued that, regardless of whether the state or
the accused is appellant, evidence adduced in a criminal case
cannot be brought before the supreme court for consideration
unless it has been incorporated in a bill of exceptions. The case
thus squarely presented an issue as to whether the requirement
of a formal bill of exceptions as the basis of an appeal applies
to appeals by the state, as well as to appeals by the defendant.
Judge Holcombe, who wrote the majority opinion after the
original hearing, carefully analyzed those articles of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which provide for the bill of exceptions and
concluded that their requirements were applicable only to appeals by the defense. Article 498, dealing with the scope of the
bill of exceptions, declares that it is grounded upon the trial
court's ruling on "some purely incidental question" arising during the course of the trial. Bills of exceptions taken to various
adverse rulings during the trial serve as the basis of defendant's
appeal after verdict. Appeals by the state, on the other hand,
are based upon final rulings which result in a dismissal of a case
prior to verdict. The appeal in the LeCompte case was from an
order dismissing the prosecution on the ground that the indictment was prescribed. This was clearly not "some purely inciden103. Art. 499, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.

104. 36 So. (2d) 695 (La. 1948).
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tal question arising during the progress of the cause." Judge
Holcombe also placed emphasis upon the language of Article
500 which refers only to "the accused" in providing that the evidence upon which the ruling complained of is based shall be
shown in the bill of exceptions. This article was interpreted as
stating the nature and content of the bill of exceptions which
defense counsel must take to incidental trial rulings if they are
to serve as the basis of an appeal. Since the article refers only to
the accused, it should not be construed as meaning that the
state must employ the bill of exceptions as a means of getting
evidence in the record for an appeal. "It suffices," declared
Judge Holcombe, "if the evidence has been taken down and
10 5
forms a part of the transcript of the appeal, as in this case."
In essence, Judge Holcombe's analysis of pertinent articles of
the Code of Criminal Procedure led him to the conclusion that
the bill of exceptions is a device for objecting to and preserving
a record of incidental trial irregularities which defense counsel
intends to urge as the basis of an appeal after conviction. It is
not contemplated as a procedure which must also be followed
by the state when it appeals from a judgment dismissing the
prosecution prior to trial.
Justice Fournet's equally elaborate dissenting opinion
stressed the fundamental idea that the bill of exceptions is a
device of general application. It is not to be considered as an
appellate procedure applicable solely to the defense, but is rather to be considered as "the vehicle by which those errors not
patent on the face of the record are made a part thereof."'10 6
Numerous Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, cited by Justice
Fournet, have held that a clerk's note on evidence is not a part
of the formal record unless it is' incorporated in a bill of exceptions. Justice Fournet saw no reason why the requirement of a
formal preservation of the evidence and rulings which are to
serve as the basis of an appeal should not be equally binding
when the state is appealing.
On a rehearing of the case the majority of the court adopted
the view of Justice Fournet. Justice Moise, who wrote the majority opinion on rehearing, reaffirmed the supreme court's previous holding in State v. LeBleu'0 7 that evidence from the trial
of the case "cannot be considered, even though in the transcript
105. 36 So. (2d) 695, 698.
106. 36 So. (2d) 695, 700.
107. 203 La. 337, 14 So. (2d) 17 (1943).
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unless it is annexed to and made a part of the bill that has been
timely reserved," and that it is "of no moment" whether the
complainant is the accused or the state. 08 Consequently, the
note of evidence, relied uporr by the state to show that the threeyear prescriptive period had been interrupted could not be considered by the supreme court in determining the issues presented.
Probably Judge Holcombe, whose opinion was reversed on the
rehearing, was correct in this treatment of the bill of exceptions
as a defense appellate device. On the other hand, the view finally
adopted is pretty well in accord with the general concensus of
judicial opinion as to what constitutes the record before the
supreme court when a case is appealed. In this regard Justice
McCaleb's concurring opinion on the rehearing is significant.
Justice McCaleb declared that, as an original proposition, he
would agree with Judge Holcombe that the provisions in the
Code of Criminal Procedure do not require or contemplate that
the state reserve a formal bill of exceptions in order that the
supreme court may consider evidence. However, Justice McCaleb
felt impelled to bow to the weight of stare decisis. He concurred
with the majority opinion on the rehearing, because he felt that
the supreme court should not overrule its former holding in the
LeBleu case unless that decision was clearly erroneous and was
likely to be harmful in its results. In that regard, he concluded
that "there can be little question as to the fairness of the decision
as it merely charges the district attorney with the same obligation imposed on the defendant by the Code of Criminal Procedure in cases where the state has the right of appeal."
Appeal-Insufficiency of the Evidence
A number of 1947-1948 decisions applied the well settled
rule that the sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction
in a criminal case is a factual question and not reviewable by
the supreme court. In State v. Saia'0 9 a review of the testimony
convinced the court "that some legal evidence, although circumstantial, was adduced of the facts essential to a conviction." As
a result only a question of fact was presented, and the supreme
court was without appellate jurisdiction to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Similarly, the supreme court refused to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in
108. 203 La. 337, 340, 341, 14 So. (2d) 17, 18.
109. 212 La. 868, 33 So. (2d) 665 (1947).
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State v. Williams,110 State v. Calloway,"' and State v. Mattio.112
Where, however, no evidence whatever is offered upon which a
conviction could be predicated, a question of law is presented
which is reviewable by the supreme court. Thus in State v.
Wooderson,13 where the indictment charged the crime of obscenity by means of the public performance of an act of lewdness
or indecency, and the evidence clearly showed that the defendant was guilty of nothing more than the solicitation of such an
act, the supreme court reviewed the case and reversed the
conviction.
Appeal from Orleans Parish Juvenile Court JudgmentReview of Facts
The writer has previously suggested the anomalous nature
of a special constitutional provision which extended the Louisiana Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over all Orleans
Parish Juvenile Court judgments to questions .of fact as well as
law. 1 4 By application of this rule, an adult who was convicted
in the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court of a crime affecting juveniles, such as cruelty to juveniles," 5 was entitled to a complete
review of the facts by the supreme court. The same adult defendant, if convicted in the district court of a crime not affecting
juveniles, or if convicted of a crime affecting juveniles in any
other parish than Orleans, could appeal only on questions of
law. That the supreme court would not lightly overrule the
juvenile court judge's findings of fact, especially where credibility of witnesses is involved, is indicated by the recent case
of State v. LeBlanc. 1 6 In affirming an adult defendant's conviction of indecent behavior with juveniles, where there was a
conflict in testimony between the state's witnesses who identified
the offender, and defendant's alibi witnesses, the supreme court
placed great weight upon the trial judge's determination of
110. 213 La. 924, 35 So. (2d) 856 (1948).
111. 213 La. 129, 34 So. (2d) 399 (1948).

112. 212 La. 284, 31 So. (2d) 801 (1947).
113. 213 La. 40, 34 So. (2d) 369 (1948).
114. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term
(1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 303, discussing the application of Article VII,
Section 96, of the Louisiana Constitution in State v. Williams, 210 La. 866, 28
So. (2d) 460 (1946).

115. State v. Williams, 210 La. 866, 28 So. (2d) 460 (1946).

116. 213 La. 404, 34 So. (2d) 905 (1948). Accord: State v. Saibold, 213 La.

415, 34 So. (2d) 909 (1948).

Cf. State v. Williams, 210 La. 966, 28 So. (2d) 460,

(1946), where the supreme court thoroughly reviewed the testimony, concluded that the state had failed to establish one of the elements of cruelty
to juveniles beyond a reasonable doubt, and reversed the conviction.
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credibility. Justice Hawthorne significantly pointed out that the
trial judge heard and observed all witnesses testify and was in
a much better position to weigh their testimony than the supreme
court.
A 1948 amendment of the controlling constitutional provision has now eliminated this inconsistency, and appeals from
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court judgments finding adults guilty
of crimes affecting juveniles are now limited to questions of
law, 117 as are all other appeals from criminal convictions.
117. This constitutional amendment is discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 38.

